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Abstract
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication has become one of the most popular
topic in the 5th generation (5G) mobile communication technology. D2D offers
opportunities for access to services through direct neighbor device connection
with or/and without base station (BS) assistance. Some of the possible improve-
ments using D2D communication include high data rate, network offloading and
range extension, as well as commercial and social proximity services networking.
Although a lot of studies exist in the research community, D2D communication
with one of the end users are located outside the cellular network coverage has not
received enough attention. Some of the problems faced in this case are discover-
ing process of neighbor user equipment (UE) and services, as well as designing
suitable and secure protocols for D2D communication.
Toward these problems, two protocols (reactive and proactive) for neighbor and
service discovery are proposed in this thesis. Implementation of reactive pro-
tocol, proactive protocol, simulation and validation are shown. Furthermore, the
proposed protocols are improved with additional security enhancement. The over-
head calculation results show that reactive protocol achieves better performance
when data traffic load is lower whereas proactive is preferred with higher traffic
load in D2D communication.
Keywords: D2D communication, ProSe discovery, protocol overhead, security
enhancement and partial support.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
D2D is becoming a hot topic in wireless communication and mainly investigated
under the perspective of providing new commercial services or public safety prox-
imity services (ProSe) [1]. This chapter gives an overview of D2D communica-
tion which is one of the promising technologies for the 5G mobile communication
system. It provides the background of neighbor and service discovery protocol as
well as a general analysis of D2D security. Problem statement, problem solution,
methodology and thesis outline are presented herein.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Due to the rapid growth of applications data of smartphone, tablet and personal
computers (PCs), the amount of cellular traffic is increasing day by day. There-
fore, it becomes difficult to the network infrastructure to response to all requests
in a timely manner. There are many factors which make the network infrastruc-
ture unable to serve users. For instance, traffic overload/congestion in network,
power outage in system, natural disaster, and terrorist attack [2]. In case of natural
disaster and terrorist attack, it is necessary to notify the users (for example fam-
ily and friends) about their condition. In such scenarios, it becomes impossible
for people to reach to one another or/and help center with destroyed cellular net-
work. Hence, D2D is adopted by the 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP)
in long term evolution-advanced (LTE-A) (Release 12) [2] in order to overcome
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from previously specified problems. Beside public safety scenario, D2D also has
commercial usages. For example, if any restaurant wants to advertise its food dis-
count scheme to its nearby mobile user then it can broadcast the messages either
via BS or via ProSe enabled UE. Any interested UE which is in the proximity
distance to restaurant’s UEs can reserve the table or/and food directly using its
ProSe without passing through the BS.
The UEs, which are sending and receiving data traffic, must be assured that their
data is not accessible to the other UEs and UEs are not compromised. Therefore,
security plays an important role to successfully conduct the D2D communication
in cellular networks. Generally, in regular LTE-A cellular networks, the BS and
UEs adopt the standard LTE-A security mechanism. Operators have responsibility
for securing the network by using strong and reliable methods of authentication,
authorization and integrity [3]. During D2D communication process, infrastruc-
ture like BS does not assist to establish the secure connection between UEs [4].
Due to security weaknesses in D2D protocols, attackers can steal the personal in-
formation from core network, modify user’s information and invade user’s privacy
by breaking the user’s devices or network [3]. A protocol is said to be secure if it
satisfies the minimum-security requirements such as confidentiality, integrity, au-
thentication, availability and accessibility (CIAAA) [5]. Various encryption/de-
cryption algorithm should be used to secure the information exchanged among
UEs.
Adding D2D communication in cellular system maintains the quality of existing
voice communication because it will decrease traffic via BS [6]. UEs inside the
network coverage area can also get benefits from D2D communication such as
higher data rates due to better channel quality and less power consumption [6].
Bluetooth and ultraviolet (UV) are few unlicensed technologies used for commu-
nication among UEs. High interference, higher energy consumption and low area
coverage are one of the problems that Bluetooth and UV are facing. D2D com-
munication is an option to overcome from such problems. It potentially saves
energy consumption by reusing cellular resources, reducing interference, utilizing
peer-to-peer links for users in proximity of each other [7], as well as it is licensed
technologies.
Even though D2D has promising features, there are still many task in order to im-
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plement such a new communication where end users are located inside and outside
coverage area. Device discovery, resource allocation and security are some of the
key challenges D2D communications are facing in above mentioned scenario. In
order to implement D2D communication, UE should discover the nearby UEs in
its proximity area. While applying device discovery procedure, it must fulfill the
general requirements like fast discovery, low energy consumption and minimize
interference [8]. Since the devices are mobile, change in location of the device is
expected. Therefore, discovering of nearby devices become difficult. The avail-
ability of resources for D2D communications is one of the challenging factors due
to limited resources for D2D communication. For this reason, it is vital to adopt
the communication protocols that utilize less resources.
Furthermore, security aspects of D2D communication has not been addressed
enough for the scenario where one of the end users is not covered by BS. Two
UEs participating in D2D communication must ensure that they are communi-
cating with legitimate UEs and the information they are receiving are correct. If
security mechanism is not applied during device discovery or communication pro-
cess, the information might be altered or misused by a malicious user. Therefore,
it becomes necessary to secure the data during UEs discovering and/or communi-
cation process. Preserving user’s information and keeping it secret while commu-
nicating is another challenging factor. This is very critical and sensitive situation,
which must be addressed before implementing D2D communication in the cellu-
lar networks. There are many research work are performed either in the security
of D2D communication or in neighbor and service discovery protocol design, but
only limited studies have been performed which combined neighbor and service
discovery protocol design with its security enhancement. This motivate us to in-
vestigate on security enhancement of D2D communication protocol.
1.2 Problem Statement
Increased network spectral efficiency, energy efficiency, reduced transmission de-
lay, offload traffic for BS and less congestion in the cellular core network are few
advantages of D2D communication [9]. Despite of having aforementioned ad-
vantages, D2D introduces some complications. For D2D pair, discovering ProSe
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UEs as well as ProSe services within proximity distance is one of these challenges.
Due to the limited resources capacity for D2D communication, adopting commu-
nication protocol which utilizes less resource is itself one challenging factor for
D2D communication. Security in such communication is important because there
is no any central equipment to control the security mechanism between UEs. An
intruder may attacks the link between UEs or break down the UEs to steal the
valuable information. Therefore, it is necessary to address the neighbor and ser-
vice discovery protocol with security enhancement mechanism. Two scenarios
are identified and one of them is selected for protocol design.
Scenario: one of the UE is outside of the cellular coverage area. More explana-
tion about selected scenario can be found in Sec.3.2. Below are a few fundamen-
tal questions which need to be addressed before commercial deployments of D2D
communications for given scenario:
• How neighbor UEs and services are discovered when one of the UEs is
outside cellular coverage area?
• How to design and select a suitable protocol for the above mentioned sce-
nario?
• How to secure the handshake process between UEs in the designed proto-
col?
1.3 Problem Solution
The proposed protocol design is based on a hybrid network design, cellular and
ad-hoc networks. UE-Relay (UE-R)1 user is the main communication device in
the connection and it should support two different radio spectrum. One for wire-
less as ad hoc network and another for mobile networks as part of cellular back-
bone. In both connections, the handshake procedure should be done for neighbor
and service discovery before UEs actually start to communicate with each other.
UE-R or UE-End (UE-E)2 could initiate the neighbor and service discovery pro-
cess. Two protocols were proposed in this thesis, proactive and reactive protocols.
1UE-R is a UE which is inside network coverage area.
2UE-E is a UE which is outside network coverage area.
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UE-R initiates discovery process using proactive protocol whereas UE-E initiates
discovery process using reactive protocol. Firstly, our protocols focus on one UE-
E user and one UE-R user, but the protocols are equally applicable for many UE-E
users and one UE-R user. However, the number of UE-E users should be limited
according to the capacity of UE-R. In both protocols, BS does not have any role
to discover the UE-E(s). We have considered three different cases of occurrence
of D2D request to compare the performance of both protocols. Numerical analy-
sis of protocol overhead was performed in MATLAB simulation environment and
compare the results accordingly.
Security in cellular network is becoming more and more important as user shares
their personal sensitive information through the cellular devices. Hence, it is nec-
essary to detect any malicious behavior before devices start to exchange messages.
In the proposed protocols, UEs will authenticate each other within the handshak-
ing process so that the UEs can be assured that they are communicating with legit-
imate UE. Upon authentication protocol, they agree on common secret key which
will be used for encryption/decryption of messages. Diffi-Hellman key exchange
algorithm was used to establish a common secret key between UEs.
1.4 Objectives
A secure and reliable D2D commutation must enable UEs to communicate with
each other without the support from BS in a scalable, efficient, and secure manner.
The objectives of this study are as follows:
• To gain a deep understanding of D2D commutation, how D2D communica-
tion works and how neighbor and service discovery protocols work.
• To investigate on different use cases/scenarios suggested by 3GPP for de-
vice discovery process and analyze the existing D2D communication proto-
cols.
• To purpose two handshake protocols in the envisaged scenario.
• To purpose the security enhancement protocol based on Diffi-Hellman key
exchange algorithm.
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• To implement and validate the proposed protocols and security enhance-
ment protocol .
• To evaluate the performance of the proposed protocols and compare them
in terms of protocol overhead.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this Master’s thesis is organized as follows:
• Chap. 2 discusses about enabling technologies as a part of D2D communi-
cation that 3GPP organization made.
• Chap. 3 describes our proactive and reactive protocols design with given
scenarios without security mechanisms.
• Chap. 4 presents the implementation of proposed protocols as well as vali-
dation based on protocol overhead.
• Chap. 5 discusses security challenges and threats of D2D communication
as well as six ways handshake protocol for authentication and establishment
of secret key.
• Chap. 6 represents conclusions and future work.
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Related Work and Enabling
Technologies
Nowadays, there are many ongoing studies in the area of D2D communication
including device and service discovery and D2D security. In this chapter, the
general concepts related to D2D communication as well as what other researcher
already have done in this field are presented.
2.1 Concepts and Enabling Technologies
2.1.1 Proximity based services (ProSe)
ProSe are services that can be provided by the 3GPP system based on UEs being
in proximity to each other [10]. Proximity means the link between UEs which is
favorable for D2D communication. It does not mean only the distance between
them. It means the better signal quality, low signal to noise ratio (SNR), availabil-
ity of resources, delay, throughput, path gain and tolerable interference [11]. If
all of the above-mentioned requirements are satisfied, then only two UEs are said
to be in proximity to each other. D2D communication takes place between two
ProSe enabled UEs, which are in proximity with each other. The ProSe enabled
UEs means an UE that support ProSe discovery and/or ProSe communication [12]
ProSe enabled public safety UEs also support ProSe discovery and/or ProSe com-
munication, but specific to public safety scenarios.
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2.1.2 ProSe discovery and ProSe communication
Before enabling D2D communication, it is important to discover the nearby ProSe
enabled UEs. This process is called ProSe neighbor discovery as shown in Fig.
2.1. There are two types of ProSe neighbor discovery process: direct ProSe dis-
covery and network assisted ProSe discovery [10]. Direct ProSe discovery pro-
cess enables UE to discover its neighbor without taking any help from BS. This
kind of discovery occurs in public safety scenarios where network coverage is not
available. In network assisted ProSe device discovery process, BS gathers all the
related information to enable D2D communication. If two UEs are in proxim-
ity to each other, then BS will forward the required information to both UEs. If
both of UEs are willing to start the D2D communication, then the request send by
BS will be accepted otherwise rejected. This type of discovery process is mostly
applicable in the case of heavy traffic overload in BS and traffic congestion in
channel. Generally, there are two cases for device discovery procedure, open and
restricted ProSe discovery [10]. In case of open ProSe discovery, UEs does not
need permission for being discovered whereas in restricted ProSe discovery case,
permission is required from the UE for being discovered.
Figure 2.1: Neighbor and service discovery.
According to [1] there are two models for direct discovery, model A and model
B. In case of model A, UE broadcasts its identity to start D2D communication
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as shown in Fig. 2.2. If UE1 wants to start D2D communication then it will
broadcast the message “I am here” then if any other UEs in the proximity area
are interested will respond to the message. In model B, UEs either already know
Figure 2.2: Model A direct discovery.
the identity of another UEs with whom it wants to start D2D communication as
shown in Fig. 2.3a or ask if anybody is there as shown in Fig. 2.3b. In the
(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: Model B direct discovery (a) Are you there? and (b) Who is there?
discovery process, two UEs have different responsibilities namely announcing and
monitoring. UE who sends the discovery request is called announcing UE and UE
who processes the request is called monitoring UE. Announcing UE announces
9
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certain information, which might be useful for other UEs that are proximity to
announcing UE. Monitoring UE monitors the received information and process
it. After UEs discover each other, two UEs can make a direct link between them,
but it is not necessary that UEs must participate in D2D communication. In this
condition their conversations are called ProSe communication [13]. Before UEs
start to communicate with each other, UEs should be registered and authorized to
use the ProSe services and communication in ProSe application server (AS). Once
devices discover each other, they start to communicate with each other as shown
in Fig. 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Fundamental D2D communication.
According to [1] there are two different modes for ProSe direct communication.
The first mode of communication is network independent direct communication.
In this mode, direct communication does not need network assistance to authorize
the connection. The communication in this case is performed by using the locally
available information from the UEs. This type of communication is applicable
in ProSe direct one-to-one communication, ProSe direct one-to-many communi-
cation and pre-authorized ProSe enabled public safety UEs regardless of whether
UEs are served by edvolved-universal mobile telecommunications system terres-
trial radio access network (E-UTRAN) or not. The second mode of communica-
tion is network authorized direct communication. In this case, UEs require net-
work assistance by evolved packet core (EPC) to authorize the connection. This
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mode of communication is applicable in ProSe direct one-to-one communication,
when both of the UEs are served by same E-UTRAN.
2.1.3 ProSe application server
In the cellular network, BS exchanges data traffic with a large number of UEs.
During the process of establishing D2D communication, UE should deliver in-
formation about its ID as a source address, destination ID as a unique address of
proximity UE, type of D2D service that is required and location to BS. All these
data are saved in a database device called ProSe AS. Moreover, the main function
of AS is to provide authenticity and authorization of UEs. Sometimes, AS may be
installed into BS as one operation equipment. Also, AS may represent a separate
device that is connected with BS as a part of a cellular network.
2.1.4 Unicast, multicast and broadcast
There are three different ways of communication in D2D, unicasting, multicas-
ting and/or broadcasting [2]. Unicast communication means transmitting ProSe
related information to one particular UE. In this case, announcing UE already
knows the identity of monitoring UE. For example, UE1 wants to download some
application and already knows that UE2 has such type of application. Therefore,
UE1 sends discovery request directly to UE2 and after accepting UE1 request by
UE2, UE1 could download the application from UE2. If ProSe communication
occurs between one-to-many UEs in proximity, then such type of communica-
tion is called multicasting ProSe communication. Information is transmitted to a
certain number of UEs. For example, in case of some natural disaster scenario
the rescue team can communicate using one-to-many ProSe communication. One
leader can give instruction to other team members about the direction and task.
In broadcast communication, either BS or UE broadcast the discovery messages
within the proximity. BS broadcasts the information about the ProSe enabled UEs
and ProSe services. UEs broadcasts its own information and willingness to par-
ticipate in D2D communication and other related information. It is one-to-all type
of ProSe communication among UEs. For example, if one Pizza restaurant in the
city wants to advertise its discount scheme to the customer nearby the restaurant.
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The restaurant (UE) broadcasts the advertise message, so all the ProSe enabled
UEs in proximity to restaurant’s UE can get the messages.
2.1.5 Reactive and proactive protocols
Reactive and proactive are two protocols for neighbor and service discovery. Both
protocols have their own advantages and disadvantages. In proactive protocol, BS
will notify availability of ProSe services to the UE by sending multicast messages
periodically. If UE has D2D traffic to send, then it replies to the advertisement
telling the BS about its ProSe discovery request. It is possible to serve D2D UEs
by different BS. In reactive protocol, UE initiates the service discovery protocol
whenever it needs to establish D2D communication with other UEs in the network.
The main difference between these two protocols represents a UE that will initiate
D2D communication. By using reactive protocol, UE always starts D2D connec-
tion with neighbor and service discovery process. That means UE will send D2D
request message when it needs specific information from proximity UEs. On the
other hand, BS is responsible for broadcasting service advertisement messages if
proactive protocol is used. Proactive protocol is ”always on” mechanism whereas
reactive protocol is ”on demand” mechanism.
2.2 Tools for Protocol Design, Implementation and
Validation
The following tools are used for protocol design, implementation and validation:
• Simple promela interpreter (SPIN) model checker [14] is used as a formal
protocol verification tool to verify the proactive and reactive protocol in
D2D communication. SPIN is a verification tool which simulates a model
either randomly, interactively or/and guided [15]. It exhaustively checks
process meta language (PROMELA) model against correctness properties.
Mainly, SPIN is used to verify the multi threaded software programming. It
is not used to verify any hardware circuit. It has wide area of application
such as data communication protocols, operating system, switching sys-
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tems, concurrent algorithms, railway signaling protocols, control software
for spacecraft and nuclear plant [15]. Among others.
• Specification and description language (SDL) [16] (Edraw Max7 tool) di-
agram is used to graphically represents our protocol design from the point
of view of BS, UE-E, UE-R and AS. SDL provides the graphical and tex-
tual representation. SDL diagram is normally used to model the state ma-
chines in the telecommunications, aviation, automotive and medical indus-
tries which can be simulated and proven.
• MATLAB is used to compare our two proposed protocols in terms of pro-
tocol overhead.
2.3 D2D Related Activities by 3GPP
3GPP has introduced long term evolution (LTE) or E-UTRAN in its Release 8
which is the access part of the evolved packet system (EPS). EPS and E-UTRAN
are the two basic subsystems of an LTE and LTE-A architecture. E-UTRAN is
the access network of the LTE system which consist of evolved node base station
(eNB) as a main entities for macro-cells and home evolved base stations (HeNBs)
for the femto-cells and the UEs [17]. EPS is the latest evolution of the 3GPP
core network architecture. It is the core network of the LTE system based upon
internet protocol (IP) [18]. LTE uses orthogonal frequency fivision multiplexing
access (OFDMA) technology for down-link and spatial carrier sense orthogonal
frequency division multiple access (SC-OFDMA) for up-link. It supports both
frequency division duplex (FDD), time division duplex (TDD) and half duplex
FDD for same radio access technology. The LTE access network is simply a net-
work of BS, eNB, generating a flat architecture [19].
LTE-A was introduced in Release 10 of 3GPP. The main focus of LTE-A is to
achieve higher capacity. It provides a higher bit rates in a cost efficient way and
at the same time, completely fulfill the requirements set by international telecom-
munication union (ITU) for international mobile telecommunication (IMT) ad-
vanced. The main new functionality introduced in LTE-A is carrier aggregation
(CA), enhanced use of multi antenna techniques, D2D and support for relay nodes
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[20].
5G is the next phase of mobile telecommunication standards beyond the 4th gen-
eration (4G) which is expected to be in use in 2020. 5G is an integration of several
technologies, use cases and standards such as internet of things (IoT), broadcast
like services and lifeline communication. D2D communication has been regarded
as a part of 5G mobile communication technology in its Mobile and wireless com-
munications enablers for the twenty-twenty information society (METIS) project
[21]. METIS project develops D2D technology components applicable in emer-
gency/public safety scenarios.
2.4 Related Research Work on D2D Protocol Design
D2D is an extremely interesting research topic due to its abilities to save en-
ergy, operate in disaster situations, work without/partial support from infrastruc-
ture [22] and provides advertising and other relevant information to the end user.
3GPP continues to work on developing new popular technology as D2D commu-
nications in different scenarios. In addition, a lot of scientific research workers
and telecommunication organizations are interested in its improvement and oper-
ation process. Related works to D2D are addressed.
According to [23], the authors suggested two D2D service discovery protocols,
reactive (so-called “on-demand” protocol) and proactive (so-called “always on”
protocol). Both of these protocols are focused on D2D connection covered by
BS. The main difference between these protocols represents a device that initi-
ates D2D connection. In their scenario, by using reactive protocol the end user
will start handshake process for D2D communication. The second type, proactive
protocol represents the initiation of D2D communication from BS. In that case,
BS periodically sends multicast discovery message to all end users. The general
conclusion is that, reactive protocol is better if needed to use low D2D traffic.
However, proactive protocol has better performance if many end users want to
initiate D2D communication.
The authors in [24] represent a review of D2D communications in cellular net-
work. In addition, they defined two main different types of connections, inbound
and outbound. The main different between inbound and outbound D2D connec-
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tions represents licensed and unlicensed network. They classified inbound com-
munication into two subgroups as underlay and overlay. The main problems that
they found in underlay were the power control and signal overlapping between
D2D and cellular end users. On the other hand, overlay does not have interfer-
ence problems, but spectral efficiency is less in compare with underlay type. Fur-
thermore, outbound has two sub-classes, controlled and autonomous connections.
However, those types of communication do not have the same issues as inbound.
Since, outbound belongs unlicensed network, the main problem faced is uncon-
trolled connections with less control capability of Quality of Service (QoS).
The work in [3] has addressed security related issues and potential solutions in
D2D. They have purposed security architecture and discuss security requirements
and threats. The first step in D2D is to discover devices within its proximity
and establish a communication. Security must be implemented before start to
exchange information. Therefore the authors have proposed ProSe security ar-
chitecture to protect the network connection and information. The authors have
mentioned the different types of threats to the D2D communication. For example,
eavesdropping, impersonate attack, active attack on traffic data, active attack on
control data, denial of service attack and man in the middle attack. For the secu-
rity purposes five different security features against attacks have been discussed.
These functions are network access security, network domain security, user do-
main security, application domain security, visibility and configuration security.
The authors in [25] proposed a secure key establishment protocol between two
mobile users in D2D. They have also investigated the security requirements and
challenges for key agreement protocol. Their approached is based upon the Diffi-
Hellman key agreement protocol and commitment scheme. The design details
and security analysis of the proposed protocol were represented. They combined
their proposed protocol with existing Wi-Fi direct protocol and implemented it
in Android smartphone. In [22] the authors have proposed a security protocol for
public safety scenario. They also showed the existence of trade off points between
connectivity and the increased overhead added by security for different values of
the system parameters.
The 3GPP organization created a several technical reports (TRs) for the future de-
velopment work relevant to D2D communication. The one of the first stage was
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to create all possible scenarios and use case diagrams from service aspect. Thus
document TR22.803 [26] gives feasibility study for ProSe with 13 general use
cases and 13 public safety scenarios. The main studies of LTE and LTE-A radio
technology are specified in the 36th TR series done by 3GPP. The more specific
part is discussed in TR36.803 [14] as LTE D2D communication with ProSe from
radio aspects.
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Scenarios and Protocol Design
The Discovering process represents the primary task for D2D communication and
it starts before initiating the communication between two UEs. In addition, dis-
covery mechanism includes both neighbor and service discovery processes. In
this chapter, 3GPP scenarios of D2D communication and our selected scenario
for protocols design are presented.
3.1 3GPP Scenarios
TR23.703 [1] is specified technical solution as the second stage. It is based on
the relevant requirements from the stage one (TR22.803). The main study repre-
sents the possible 3GPP technical solutions for architectural enhancements which
ProSe is required. This TR contains 38 solutions as follows: 11 proposed cover-
ing ProSe discovery, 6 for communication, 11 for relays, 5 for identities, 3 with
wireless local area network direct communication and 2 for configurations. Fig.
3.1 shows D2D scenarios which are explained in TR23.703. The first part of that
figure, 1A represents a simple ad-hoc connection between two UEs in unlicensed
network. However, it shows D2D communication without associating with BS. In
1B scenario, one UE is associated with the BS as a part of cellular network and
the other UE is out of coverage. The third part, 1C gives similar scenario as a
previous 1B. However, both UEs realize D2D communication while they are re-
ceiving cellular signal from the same BS, located in identical public land mobile
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Figure 3.1: 3GPP D2D scenarios [1].
network (PLMN). In some of the situations, both UEs may detect D2D signal of
each other even though they operate in the separate cells. In the other words, UEs
are located inside coverage of the two different BSs from the same PLMN as situ-
ation 1D. The rest part of the mentioned figure, scenarios 1E, 1F and 1G represent
D2D communication between UEs which operate in the separate PLMNs. Since,
there are a lot of different mobile telecommunications operators, which operate
together in the same area, their cellular signals may overlap. Specially, when UE
acts on the edge of the cell, it may receive signal from the other PLMN. The part
1E shows that UEs receive cellular signal from the both BSs which belong to the
different PLMNs. The next scenario, 1F is similar as previous one. The main dif-
ference is that only one UE receives the signal from the both BSs, while BSs do
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not belong to the common PLMN. The last possible 3GPP scenario represents two
UEs in the cooperation with separate BSs in the different PLMNs. Anyway, UEs
are located in the proximity area for establishing D2D connection. 3GPP scenario
1B is selected as the basic scenario in our protocol design.
3.2 Our Selected Scenarios
Fig. 3.2a and Fig. 3.2b show possible situations for proposed protocols design
where BS cooperates with UE-R which is inside coverage area. Here, UE-R must
respect a role of the cellular network as others UEs. Further, the selected scenario
is divided into two parts: primary and secondary. Primary scenario consists of
only one UE-R and one UE-E as shown in Fig. 3.2a. Secondary scenario con-
tains one UE-R and multiple UE-Es as shown in Fig. 3.2b. For simplicity, the
primary scenario is considered for proposed protocols design. However, proposed
protocols are equally applicable for secondary scenario too. In addition, before
discovery process starts, UE’s ProSe registration process is already performed.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: (a) Primary scenario: one UE-E outside and one UE-R inside cov-
erage and (b) Secondary scenario: multiple UE-Es outside and one UE-R inside
coverage.
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3.3 Reactive Protocol Design
Proposed reactive protocol is based on the primary scenario where UEs are willing
to be discovered for D2D communication. First, UE-E initiates discovery process
by sending a discovery message to UE-R. The discovery message includes UE-
R’s identity and type of the required service. Connection between them is directly
as one-to-one. With reactive protocol, D2D initiation process is started only when
UE-E requires ProSe. Otherwise, D2D connection is closed. Such type of D2D
communication is called PULL mechanism. Since, UE-E is outside of coverage
area, BS does not exchange any handshake messages with it. UE-R plays a role
as relay to forward all detail information about UE-E to BS. According to the
information which are received from UE-R, BS and AS check the authenticity
and authorization of UE-E for using ProSe. Therefore, BS does not apply any role
for the D2D discovery process. If UE-E is satisfied all the requirements for ProSe,
then steps of delivering service information should be continued. Our proposed
protocol as shown in Fig. 3.3 is divided into two phases, neighbor and service
discovery phase and ongoing D2D communication. In the first phase, the total
number of handshake messages is six. In ongoing D2D communication section,
the total number of exchanged messages is also six. In the showed protocol design,
the last three handshake messages are used for the D2D termination process. The
total number of ProSe handshake messages by using reactive protocol is fifteen.
All those fifteen messages are considered for calculation of the protocol overhead,
which is discussed in Chap. 4. The main required steps for neighbor and service
discovery process are described as follows:
Neighbor and service discovery phase:
• Step 1: UE-E sends ”Discovery signal” to UE-R. ”Discovery signal” con-
tains source ID, destination ID, type of required service, location of UE-E.
• Step 2: UE-R calculates distance between UE-R and UE-E, delay, signal
quality, SINR, and interference. UE-R forwards all these information to
BS and asks for permission to establish D2D connection and to deliver re-
quested services to UE-E.
• Step 3: BS checks the authority of UE-E. If it is authorized, then BS asks
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Figure 3.3: Discovery process using reactive protocol.
AS for the availability of services. Otherwise, BS replies with negative
response to UE-R.
• Step 4: AS checks availability of services and responses positive, if it has
services requested by UE-E. Otherwise it sends negative response to BS.
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• Step 5: BS sends positive response to UE-R, if it received positive response
from AS.
• Step 6: UE-R relays to UE-E the response of BS.
• Step 7: UE-E sends ”D2D communication request” in order to access the
services.
Ongoing D2D communication phase:
• Step 8: UE-R sends ”Relays services request” to BS.
• Step 9: BS asks AS to provide the services.
• Step 10: AS provides the services information to BS.
• Step 11: BS forwards the services information to UE-R.
• Step 12: UE-R relays the services provided by BS. The steps from 9 to 12
are continued until either UE-R or UE-E terminates D2D communication.
• Step 13: UE-E sends ”BYE” messages to UE-R.
• Step 14: UE-R sends ”ACK”.
• Step 15: UE-R relays ”BYE” messages to BS. D2D connection is now dis-
connected.
3.4 Proactive Protocol Design
In proactive protocol, UE-R does not wait for UE-E(s) to start D2D communi-
cation as with reactive protocol. UE-R relays the services advertisement infor-
mation from BS. Any interested UE-E(s) response to this message. During the
device discovery process, the type of communication between UE-R and UE-Es
is multicast. However, after completion of D2D discovery process between them,
they exchange unicast messages. Also, D2D connection between UE-R and UE-E
is initiated even though UE-E does not require specific service information. Such
type is called PUSH mechanism.Proactive protocol is very useful for commercial
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companies, who want to promote and provide information about themselves to the
customers. The proposed proactive protocol design is divided into thirteen steps
also with two phases. Fig3.4 represents proposed primary scenario for proactive
Figure 3.4: Discovery process using proactive protocol.
protocol design with handshake processes as follows:
Neighbor and service discovery phase:
• Step 1: BS suggests ”Service advertisement” to UEs in its coverage by
using broadcast message.
• Step 2: UE-R as a relay device sends ”Multicast D2D service invitation” to
the proximity UE-E(s). Multicast message contains its ID and type of the
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service information.
• Step 3: UE-E replies with unicast ”D2D response” message to UE-R as
acceptance of service invitation.
• Step 4: UE-R asks BS for D2D request permission by sending information
about UE-E.
• Steps 5, 6 and 7: represent D2D checking processes for UE-E. BS sends
to AS ”Forwards D2D request”. Afterwards, AS saves the information
about UE-E in its database and checks channel capacity for it. After this
procedure, AS answers on UE-R’s request by sending ”D2D admission”
message via BS.
Service selection and ongoing D2D communication phase:
• Step 8: UE-E chooses the specific service that is interested by sending
”D2D service selection and invitation” to UE-R.
• Step 9: UE-R forwards service request to BS.
• Steps 10, 11 and 12: represent the service provisioning phase from BS to
UE-R. It requires service checking and confirmation from AS, with process-
ing and distributing the requested service information.
• Step 13: UE-R delivers ”Relay D2D service” information by unicast mes-
sages.
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has discussed about the different D2D scenarios suggested by 3GPP
and the scenario we selected for protocol design. We selected the scenario 1B as
suggested by 3GPP where one UE is located outside coverage area. The scenario
is further divided into primary and secondary. The primary scenario is based on
one UE-E and one UE-R and secondary scenario is depend on one UE-R and mul-
tiple UE-Es. We proposed the neighbor and service discovery protocols, reactive
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and proactive for given scenarios. In the reactive protocol UE-E initiates the dis-
covery process where as in proactive UE-R initiates the discovery process after
receiving service broadcast message from BS. The total number of messages ex-
changed in reactive protocol are 15 where as in proactive protocol the number is
16. In case of proactive, UE-R always multicast the discovery request even though
if it does not receive response from UE-E(s).
Table 3.1: Difference between reactive and proactive protocols
Reactive protocol Proactive protocol
Announcing/Monitoring UE-E/UE-R UE-R/UE-E
Communicaiton Unicast Multicast during discovery
process and unicast during
communication process
Number of exchanged
messages
15 14+2 (one broadcast and one
multicast discovery message)
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Chapter 4
Protocol Implementation and
Validation
This chapter describes the implementation and validation of proposed reactive
and proactive protocols. The implementation and validation processes are based
on primary design. Also, the calculation and comparison of proactive and reactive
protocols overhead are shown below.
4.1 Protocol Implementation using SDL
4.1.1 SDL implementation from UE-E’s prospective
With reactive protocol, D2D connection is initiated from UE-E’s side. There-
fore, implementation process starts from the same position. Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2
show the SDL diagrams and illustrate of exchanging messages from the UE-E’s
perspective by using reactive and proactive protocols. On the following figures,
the shown numbers are associated with the numbers of the handshake messages
from the proposed protocol design graphs. Considering that UE-E has D2D com-
munication channel only with UE-R, their handshake messages are described as
follows:
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Figure 4.1: SDL diagram from UE-E for reactive protocol.
• UE-E sends ”Neighbor and Discovery request” signal to UE-R as message
1.
• During timeout period, UE-E waits for UE-R reply. After timeout period, if
UE-R does not answer on request, UE-E repeats the same request.
• UE-E receives ”Relay D2D admission” from UE-R as message 6.
• In order to access service information, UE-E sends ”D2D communication
request” as message 7.
• For the time out period UE-E waits for ”Relay D2D service”, message 12.
If it does not get any answer, UE-E repeats the same message several times
until timeout counter become null.
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Figure 4.2: SDL diagram from UE-E for proactive protocol.
• UE-E sends ”BYE” in message 13 for termination the D2D communication
with UE-R.
• UE-E receives ”ACK” as confirmation of ending the communication.
The description of SDL implementation from UE-E’s prospective for proactive
protocol is similar to SDL implementation of reactive protocol. However, in the
case of using proactive protocol, UE-E starts D2D communication process by
receiving initiation message from UE-R.
4.1.2 SDL implementation from UE-R’s prospective
Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 show the SDL diagrams from the point of view of UE-R for
reactive and proactive protocols respectively. The shown messages are exchanged
between UE-R with its neighbors UE-E and BS by using reactive protocol as
follows:
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Figure 4.3: SDL diagram from UE-R for reactive protocol.
• UE-R receives ”Neighbor and Discovery request” from UE-E as message
1.
• In order to ask for D2D communication permission, UE-R sends ”Relay
D2D request” to BS (message 2). If UE-R does not receive any answer
from BS, it repeats the same request.
• UE-R receives ”Forward D2D admission” from BS (message 5).
• UE-R sends ”Relay D2D admission” to UE-E as message 6.
• UE-R receives ”D2D communication request” from UE-E (message 7).
• In order to get service information, UE-R sends ”Relay service request” to
BS as message 8.
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Figure 4.4: SDL diagram from UE-R for proactive protocol.
• During timeout period, UE-R receives ”Service provisioning” message from
BS. If UE-R does not receive service information, it repeats its request sev-
eral times until counter is active.
• UE-R forwards ”Relay D2D service” to UE-E and delivers service infor-
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mation to UE-E (message 12).
• For termination process of D2D connection, UE-R receives ”BYE” from
UE-E as message 13.
• Messages 14 and 15, ”ACK” and ”BYE notification” are sent from UE-R
to inform UE-E and BS that D2D communication is terminated.
By using proactive protocol the SDL implementation from UE-R’s point of view
represents receiving broadcast message from the BS as a first step. In this case,
UE-R sends multicast ”D2D service invitation” message to its neighbors UE-Es.
The rest of SDL implementation steps are the similar as the SDL implementation
of reactive protocol design.
4.1.3 SDL implementation from BS’s prospective
Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6 show the SDL diagrams from the point of BS’s view for
reactive and proactive protocol respectively. Messages that BS exchanges with
UE-R and AS as its neighbor devices by using reactive protocol are described as
follows:
• BS receives ”Relay D2D request” from UE-R as message 2.
• After processing time, BS sends ”Forward D2D request” to AS (message
3). During timeout period, BS receives ”D2D admission” from AS (mes-
sage 4). Otherwise, BS repeats same request.
• BS establishes communication with UE-R by sending message 9 (”Forward
D2D admission”).
• By receiving ”Relay service request” from UE-R, BS forwards the same
request to AS as ”Forward service request” (message 10).
• BS receives ”Service confirmation” from AS and forwards it to UE-R as
”Service provisioning”, messages 11 and 12. Unless, if BS does not receive
the answer from AS, it repeats message 10 several times until counter is
active. Otherwise, BS goes in idle state.
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• After completion provisioning of D2D service, BS receives ”BYE notifica-
tion” from UE-R as message 16.
Figure 4.5: SDL diagram from BS for reactive protocol.
4.1.4 SDL implementation from AS’s prospective
Fig. 4.7a and Fig. 4.7b show the SDL diagrams from the point of view of AS for
reactive and proactive protocol respectively. The messages exchange between AS
and BS for reactive protocol are as follows:
• AS receives ”Forward D2D request” as message 3.
32
CHAPTER 4. PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION AND VALIDATION
Figure 4.6: SDL diagram from BS for proactive protocol.
• After processing time, AS replays to BS by sending ”D2D admission”
(message 4).
• AS receives from BS ”Forward service request” as message 9.
• AS sends ”Service confirmation” as message 10 to BS.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: SDL diagram form AS’s prospective for (a) Reactive protocol and (b)
Proactive protocol.
4.2 Protocol Validation using SPIN
In order to validate the proposed protocols, it is necessary to simulate them. In this
section, two different SPIN output as simulate and verification are represented.
(i) SPIN simulate output for reactive and proactive protocol Fig. 4.8 and Fig.
4.9 illustrate SPIN simulate output for reactive and proactive protocol re-
spectively. These diagrams represent exchanging handshake messages be-
tween UE-E, UE-R, BS and AS during D2D neighbor and service discovery
process. In the figures below, EndUser represents UE-E, RealyUser repre-
sents UE-R, BaseStation represents BS and AppServer represents AS. Those
graphs show exchanging handshake messages without “black hole”. In other
words, proposed reactive and proactive protocols work constantly without
loop.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4.8: SPIN simulate output for reactive protocol.
The meaning of the messages exchanged among UE-E, UE-R, BS and AS
are described as follows:
• ”discovery req” message is sent by UE-E to UE-R as neighbor and
service discovery message which UE-R relays to BS and BS forward
to AS.
• ”d2d adm” is message from AS as a response of ”discovery req”
message.
• ”service req” and ”serv req” is a service discovery message for re-
active and proactive protocol respectively.
• ”got ser” and ”serv conf” is reply from AS as a response of ”service req”
and ”serv req” respectively which UE-R relays to UE-E for reactive
and proactive protocol respectively.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4.9: SPIN simulate output for proactive protocol.
• ”BY E” is for termination of connection.
• ”ack” is acknowledgment of ”BY E” message.
• ”broad” is broadcast service message sent by BS to all UE-Rs in proac-
tive protocol.
• ”d2d inv” is multicast service message sent by UE-R.
• ”d2d resp” is neighbor and service discovery message as response of
”d2d inv”.
• ”d2d req” is D2D request message send by UE-R to BS at the instance
of UE-E.
(ii) SPIN verification output for reactive and proactive protocol
The verification of reactive and proactive protocols is shown in Fig. 4.10.
represents validation output of reactive protocol and it is reached 35 states
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as the longest depth state without errors. Moreover, validation output of
proactive protocol is shown in the Fig. 4.11. That protocol is reached the
longest depth position of 42 states, also without errors. The full simulation
of a global system state required 35 bytes of memory per every state for
reactive and 44 bytes for proactive protocol. With those validation output
parameters of the proposed protocols, reactive and proactive are designed
and simulated to work without errors.
Figure 4.10: SPIN verification output for reactive protocol.
Figure 4.11: SPIN verification output for proactive protocol
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4.3 Protocol Overhead Comparison
4.3.1 Spatial distribution of UE-Es
Before proceeding of the protocol overhead calculation for the different cases of
D2D request, it is important to analyze the behavior of UE-E. In other words,
how UE-Es are distributed and what is the probability for occurrence at least k
numbers of D2D request within a given distance. As shown in Fig. 4.12, UE-Es
are randomly distributed according to the Poisson point process, which represents
the most important model for random point pattern [27]. In addition, assume that
the position of UE-R is fixed for BS. In Fig. 4.12, O is the center of the cell where
Figure 4.12: Spatial distribution of UE-Es outside of coverage area.
BS is located, O1 is the point where UE-R is located, which is r distance far from
BS. It is assumed that there are total N number of UE-Es which are randomly
distributed within area S and proximity distance D from UE-R. Among N UE-
Es, only n UE-E(s) want to have D2D communication with UE-R. In our scenario
UE-R located inside coverage area, so that it covers UEs, which located inside and
outside cell coverage. However, we are not considering UEs inside cell coverage
area. Therefore, we should calculate the user density outside coverage area . The
UE-E density within area S is calculated as follows [27]:
λ “ N
S
(4.1)
As shown in Fig. 4.13, S is calculated by subtracting shaded area s from semi
circle area S 1 having radius R1 .
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Figure 4.13: UE-Es density calculation.
S “ S 1 ´ s (4.2)
S
1 “ pi ˆR12 (4.3)
Area of shaded portion is calculated as follows [28]:
s “ R2 ˆ cos´1pR ´ h
R
q ´ pR ´ hqap2R ˆ h´ h2 (4.4)
where h is the height of the shaded arced portion and R is the radius of network
coverages cell.
UE-R and UE-E form a D2D pair if and only if the distance d between them is
less than or equal to targeted distance D. The probability that the nearest distance
between two UEs forming the D2D pair is shorter than or equal to the targeted
distance D meter(s) within a given area is calculated as follows [27]:
P pd ď Dq “ 1´ e´λˆpiˆD2 (4.5)
Fig. 4.14 explains that UE-R has at least k number of UE-E(s) as its nearest
neighbor within D meter(s). Assume that is selected n number of UE-E(s) among
N UE-E(s). In interval of n UE-E(s), UE-R should have at least k number of
nearest neighbor UE-E(s) which is located in D meter(s) away from UE-R. These
k UE-E(s) forms the D2D pair(s) with UE-R. To find out the k success out of n
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observations, binomial distribution is used as [27]:
P pkq “ 1´
8ÿ
i“0
ˆ
n
i
˙
p1´ pqippn´iq (4.6)
where p is the probability without nearest neighbor within distance D and calcu-
lated as:
p “ 1´ P pd ď Dq (4.7)
Fig. 4.14 shows that when transmission distance D increasing, the probability of
Figure 4.14: Probability function for random distribution of UE-Es.
having UE-E(s) in UE-R’s proximity increases too. If more UE-Es are in neigh-
borhood of UE-R, there is the high probability that at least k UE-E(s) may make
the D2D pair with UE-R.
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4.3.2 Case I : Same number of requests occurs at each timeslot
Figure 4.15: Same number of requests per timeslot.
Fig. 4.15 explains our case I, which deals with the condition when there is the
same number of D2D requests at each timeslot. First consider the case where the
total number of the D2D request is one at each timeslot and second case when
the total number of the D2D request is more than one. For the calculation of the
second condition is assumed that the number of D2D request is five. The control
overhead for proactive and reactive protocol is calculated as in equations 4.8 and
4.9.
COp “ T
1 ˆ p2` p14ˆMqq ` p2ˆ pT ´ T 1q
T
(4.8)
COr “ T
1 ˆ 15ˆM
T
(4.9)
Result of case I
The network parameters for calculation of protocol overhead for both proactive
and reactive protocols are described in Tab. 4.1. Fig. ?? shows the comparison
between reactive and proactive protocols in terms of protocol overhead where
number of D2D requests at each timeslot is fixed.
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Table 4.1: Network parameters configuration to calculate control overhead for
case I
Parameters Symbols Values
Total number of UE-Es. N 15
Number of UE-Es participating in D2D communication. n 10
Total timeslots. T 20
Timeslots where D2D request occurs T 1 1 to T
D2D request at each timeslots M 1 and 5
Figure 4.16: Protocol overhead vs. number of timeslots when M = 1.
From Fig. 4.16 it is clear that when number of D2D request is one, reactive
protocol is better to select because protocol overhead for reactive protocol is rel-
atively less in comparison to proactive protocol which has relatively more over-
head. Therefore, reactive protocol is better choice for unicast communication.
Fig. 4.17 is the graph between protocol overhead and timeslot when D2D re-
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Figure 4.17: Protocol overhead vs. number of timeslots when M = 5.
quests at each timeslot is five. From graph, we can see that until timeslot five
reactive protocol is better than proactive protocol because reactive protocol has
less overhead than proactive protocol. From timslot five to timeslot twelve, both
protocol has almost same overhead. After timeslot twelve, proactive protocol has
less overhead than reactive overhead. Therefore, we can conclude from above
graph that it is better to choose proactive protocol when there is relatively high
number D2D requests at each timeslot and overall high number of D2D requests
in one sub-frame. Therefore, proactive protocol is best choice for broadcast and
multicast communication.
4.3.3 Case II : Requests following normal distribution
Fig. 4.18 shows the graph of normally generated D2D requests per timeslot and
Fig. 4.19 shows the graph of probability density function (PDF) of normally gen-
erated requests per timeslot. Assume that N is the total number of UE-E(s) which
generate the D2D request and M is the number of requests generated per times-
43
CHAPTER 4. PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION AND VALIDATION
lot which follows the normal distribution. The PDF of normally generated D2D
requests is calculated as in equation 4.10 [29]
PDF “ 1
σ
?
2pi
exp´
pM ´ µq2
2σ2
(4.10)
where µ is the mean value of the D2D requests generated by UE-Es and σ is the
standard deviation of the normal Gaussian distribution. The value of µ is 2.14
and value of σ is 3.8. Protocol overhead for proactive and reactive protocol for
Figure 4.18: Normally distributed D2D requests.
normally distributed D2D requests is calculated as follows:
COp “ 2ˆ pT ´ T
1q ` T 1 ˆ p2` 14ˆMq
T
(4.11)
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Figure 4.19: PDF of normally generated D2D requests.
COr “ pT
1 ˆ 15ˆMq
T
(4.12)
whereCOr denotes control overhead of reactive protocol andCOp denotes control
overhead for proactive protocol.
Result of case II
Tab. 4.2 explains the necessary network parameters to calculate the control over-
head for both proactive and reactive protocols. Fig. 4.20 shows the protocol
overhead vs. normally distributed D2D request. As shown in the graph, with
higher number of the D2D request at each timeslot, control overhead of reactive
increases in comparison with proactive protocol. Therefore, proactive protocol is
preferred when D2D requests are normally distributed.
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Table 4.2: Network parameters configuration to calculate control overhead for
case II
Parameters Symbols Values
Total number of UE-Es. N 10
Total timeslots. T 20
Timeslots where D2D request occurs T 1 T
D2D request at each timeslots M [0 to N ]
Figure 4.20: Control overhead vs. normally distributed D2D request.
4.3.4 Case III : Random occurrence of D2D requests
Fig. 4.21 shows random occurrence of D2D request at each timeslot. In this case,
the number of D2D request per timeslot is not fixed. The protocol overhead for
both proactive and reactive protocol are calculated as follows:
COp “ T
1 ˆ p2` p14ˆMqq ` p2ˆ pT ´ T 1qq
T
(4.13)
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Figure 4.21: Random distribution of UE-Es.
COr “ pT
1 ˆ 15ˆMq
T
(4.14)
Result of case III
Network parameters to calculate the protocol overhead for case III is listed in Tab.
4.3. We can see in Fig. 4.22, proactive protocol has relatively more control over-
head when there is no D2D request. Reactive protocol has less overhead till num-
ber of D2D requests are 2. Both protocol has same overhead when D2D requests
are from 2 to 4. Proactive protocol has less protocol overhead in comparison to
reactive protocol as number of requests increase. In Fig. 4.23, when target dis-
tance increases number of UE-Es also increase. More UE-Es mean there is more
possibility to have D2D requests. For more D2D requests proactive performs bet-
ter because it has less overhead in comparison to reactive protocol. Therefore,
If more UE-E(s) are participating in D2D communication proactive protocol is
selected otherwise reactive is preferable.
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Figure 4.22: Protocol overhead vs. D2D requests
Figure 4.23: Protocol overhead vs. target distance
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Table 4.3: Network parameters configuration to calculate control overhead for
case III
Parameters Symbols Values
Total number of UE-Es. N 10
Total timeslots. T 20
Timeslots where D2D request occurs T 1 T
D2D request at each timeslots M [0 to N ]
Targeted distance d 0 to 100 meter
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the implementation of the proposed protocols using
SDL. The SDL diagrams from UE-E’s, UE-R’s, BS’s and AS’s prospective has
represented in this chapter. We verified the proposed protocols successfully us-
ing SPIN model checker without errors. To compare the two proposed protocols
in terms of protocol overhead, numerical calculation has performed in MATLAB
simulation. For selected scenarios, the UE-Es are situated outside coverage area
and are distributed randomly according to the Poisson point process. We used
binomial distribution function to calculate the probability function for at least k
UE-E(s) make D2D pair with UE-R. Three different cases for D2D requests as
same number of D2D requests, requests follows normal distribution and random
occurrence of D2D requests has considered to calculate the protocol overhead.
According to the result, reactive protocol has relatively more protocol overhead
in comparison to proactive protocol when there is many D2D requests. However,
proactive protocol has high overhead for less number of requests than reactive pro-
tocol. Therefore, proactive protocol is preferred in scenarios where there is rela-
tively high number of D2D requests whereas reactive is preferred for less number
of D2D requests.
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Security Enhancement of the
Proposed Protocols
In this chapter the security challenges and possible threats related to D2D com-
munication are discussed. In addition, proposed security enhancement protocol
for mutual authentication and establishment of common secret key are explained.
The proposed protocol is analyzed and validated using SPIN model checker.
5.1 Security Challenges and Threats
There are many reasons behind weak security system in D2D communication for
selected scenario. In such scenario, there is no network infrastructure to moni-
tor the suspicious activities performed by UEs [4]. D2D communication is based
upon wireless communication. Wireless communication is itself vulnerable to
many security threats such as man in the middle attack, modification of data, re-
play attack, identity spoofing, denial of service attack, jamming [3]. Hence, D2D
communication inherits all the security threats of wireless communication. Se-
curity is one of the important and major concerns for the D2D communications
which should be addressed before implementing it. In proposed security enhance-
ment protocol, we have assumed that communicating UEs are not compromised
and it only prevents the intruder to intercept the messages exchanged between
UEs.
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A D2D communication is said to be secure if it preserves the CIAAA of infor-
mation transmitted over D2D channel. Confidentiality will preserve the privacy
of information and only authorized user can have access to the information. In-
tegrity will make sure that the information is not modified during transmission by
any user. Authentication service allows only authenticated user can access the in-
formation. Similarly, availability allows legitimate users to access the information
from anywhere at any time [5]. If any one of above mentioned security conditions
break down then intruder can easily take over the D2D communication link and
do whatever he/she wants to do with the messages exchanged over it. Some of
the security threats that might happen in D2D communication [3] are described as
follows:
• Man in the middle (MIM) attack: The D2D link is considered to be insecure
mode of communication. Therefore, if proper security is not applied before
transmission, an intruder can intercept the messages transmitted over D2D
link and modify as per its requirement and transmit it to the destination UE.
An intruder makes a separate connection with both the UEs. Both UEs do
not have any idea about attack and continue communication as if messages
are originated from legitimate user.
• Replay attack: In replay attack, an intruder record the messages and re-
transmit or repeat the messages after certain time interval in the same net-
work or in different networks. The message is legitimate and it is quite
difficult to identify that the messages is not from the legitimate user.
• Identity spoofing: In identity spoofing attack, an intruder spoofs the identity
of legitimate UEs or use any identity which does not exist in the given net-
work. Spoofed UEs start D2D communication and use the ProSe provided
by D2D communication even though it is not eligible to use which leads to
misuse of resources.
• Denial of service (DoS): In DoS attack, one or many malicious UE-Es con-
tinuously send D2D request to UE-R. Due to the limited capacity of UE-R
it can not proceed all the requests send by UE-Es which causes DoS attack.
In addition, the heavy traffic in D2D channel consumes large amount of
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resources. Since the resources in D2D communication is limited, this will
cause actual UE-E users unable to access the services offered by UE-R.
5.2 Security Protocol Design
In this Master’s thesis, security enhancement protocol for mutual authentication
of UEs and establishment of common secret key based upon Diffi-Hellman key
exchanged algorithm has been proposed. The proposed protocol is applicable for
both proactive and reactive protocols as shwon in Fig. 5.1. In case of reactive
protocol, UE-R initiates the authentication process as shown in Fig. 5.1a where as
in proactive protocol, UE-E initiates the authentication process as shown in Fig.
5.1b. According to Diffi-Hellamn key exchanged algorithm [5], two UEs estab-
lished a common secret key which can be used as a secret key to encrypt/decrypt
the messages. Communicating UEs themselves are responsible for establishment
of secret key because there is not available of any key distribution infrastructure
[25].
First of all, UE-E and UE-R generates the secret number A and B respectively
and compute public key (PubK). PubK computed by UE-R is pPubKqUE´R “
gBmodP whereas public key computed by UE-E is pPubKqUE´E “ gAmodP ,
where g is common generator, B P p1, 2, 3, ...P ´ 1q, A P p1, 2, 3, ...P ´ 1q
and P is large prime number. P and g are known to all UEs in networks. UE-
R and UE-E generates the nonce Nj and Ni respectively. UE-R generates the
hash value of Nj and encrypt it by secret number B and attach with nonce Nj .
The resulting value is called digital signature (DSig) of UE-R which is given
by, pDSigqUE´R “ tEncryptrHashpNjq, Bs, Nju. Similarly, UE-E generates
the hash value of Ni which is encrypted by secret number A and attach with
nonce Ni. The resulting value is called digital signature of UE-E and is given by,
pDSigqUE´E “ tEncryptrHashpNiq, As, Niu. UE-R extract the Ni from digi-
tal signature and compute notification message as Mr “ EncrypttHashpNi ‘
Njq, pPubKqUE´Eu. Similarly, UE-E extract the Nj from digital signature and
compute notification message asMe “ EncrypttHashpNj‘Niq, pPubKqUE´Ru.
The number of steps require for mutual authentication as well as to agree on com-
mon secret key are described as follows:
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: (a) Security enhancement protocol for reactive and (b) Security en-
hancement protocol for proactive.
• Step 1: Once UE-R receive discovery request from UE-E, UE-R send pPubKqUE´R
along with pidqUE´R, pidqUE´E and Timestamps at which message is gen-
erated,
• Step 2: UE-E send pPubKqUE´E along with pidqUE´E , pidqUE´R and Timestamps
at which message is generated,
• Step 3: UE-R calculate pDSigqUE´R and send along with Timestamps at
which signature is generated to UE-E,
• Step 4: UE-E calculate pDSigqUE´E and send along with Timestamps at
which signature is generated to UE-E.
• Step 5:UE-R send Mr,
• Step 6: UE-E send Me.
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Both UE-E and UE-R decrypt Mr and Me with their private key and verify the
hash(Ni ‘Nj). After verification, both UEs agree on establishment of secret key,
Ksecret called common secret key which is used to encrypt/decrypt the rest of the
messages. Ksecret is computed asKsecret “ ppPubKqUE´EqB “ ppPubKqUE´RqA
5.3 Security Analysis of the Enhanced Protocol
To preserve CIAAA of an information, it is necessary to encrypt and digitally
sign the messages with their secret key, which only authorized or authenticated
UEs can decrypt and verify [5]. Our aim is to protect the messages exchanged
between UEs from intruder. For this purpose, we designed a protocol with the
security enhancement. The communication channel between UEs are public, so it
is possible to intercept the messages by intruder. Two UEs must be ensured that
they are communicating with legitimate UEs. This can be achieved by the process
of mutual authentication. Generally, the security mechanism between BS and UE
is based upon the standard existing security mechanism offered by LTE-A [3].
However, due to the lack of centralized security infrastructure for D2D communi-
cation, security becomes quite difficult. During this Master’s thesis, our focus is
to authenticate two UEs and establish a common secret key which is only known
to participating UEs.
The proposed security protocol is divided into two phases, mutual authentication
phase and notification phase. During mutual authentication phase, digital sig-
nature is used to authenticate each other whereas in notification phase two UEs
notify one another that they have authenticated each other. In this protocol, each
messages are send along with Timestamps. Timestamps is used to prevent the
Replay attack. Since there is possibility to record the messages and send it in
another time period. By the use of Timestamps, receiver checks the sender’s
Timestamps and compare it with its own Timestamps at which message re-
ceived. If the difference is intolerance, message will be discarded. In this way
Timestamps can prevent the Replay attack. Similarly, both the UEs generates
the nonce so that the old information can not be used in Replay attack. nonce is
the random number that is used only once in the cryptography communication.
Digital signature is used to verify the identity of sender as well as for integrity
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of the data [5]. Anyone in the network can verify the digitally signed signature
because all users in the network know the public key of sender but only sender
can digitally sign the message because only sender has access to the private key.
Therefore, verifying digital signature ensure that the sender UE is legitimate. In
the proposed security protocol, hash value of nonce is computed which is then en-
crypted with UE’s secret number which is called certificate. Certificate along with
nonce is called digitally signed data. During the verification of signature, receiv-
ing UE extracts the nonce and signature. Receiver then compute the hash value
of nonce as well as decrypt the signature with sender’s public key and recover the
hash value of nonce. Now receiver compare the computed hash value and recov-
ered hash value of data. If both hash value match then receiver verifies that the
sender is actual and legitimate and data are not tampered on its way. Hence, it
also preserves the integrity of messages.
After mutual authentication, both UEs should notify each other that they authen-
ticate each other. For the notification process, UE-R and UE-E compute the no-
tification message Mr and Me respectively. UE-E and UE-R decrypt the Mr and
Me respectively and extract hash(Ni ‘ Nj). Both UEs compare received hash
value with their own hash value. If computed hash value and received hash value
are equal then they agree to establish a common secret key which can be used as
secret key for message encryption/decryption process. The hash value of exclu-
sive OR (XOR) of both nonce are encrypted with each others public key. There-
fore, to decrypt Mr and Me UE-E and UE-R should know their respective private
key. So it is almost impossible for any intruder to modify the Me and Mr on
its way. In addition, the secret key is not exchanged during communication pro-
cess. Onle g, P , and theirs public keys are knows to intruder. Even for super
speed modern computers it is difficult to find secret value A and B with given g,
P , pPubKqUE´R and pPubKqUE´E . Such problem is called discrete logarithm
problem [30]. Therefore, intruder won’t able to intercept the secret key that UEs
has agreed on.
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5.4 Proposed Protocols with Security Enhancement
Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3 show the proposed neighbor and service discovery protocols
with security enhancement.
Figure 5.2: Reactive protocol with security enhancement.
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The security enhancement protocol is added in proposed discovery protocols de-
sign. For reactive protocol, security enhancement protocol is initiated by UE-R
after it receives Neighbor and discovery request from UE-E. UE-R does not relay
the request send by UE-E to BS until it authenticate UE-E as shown in Fig. 5.2.
For proactive protocol, UE-E initiates the security enhancement protocol after it
received Multicast D2D service invitation from UE-R as in Fig. 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Proactive protocol with security enhancement.
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5.5 Protocol Implementation using SDL
The SDL implementation for the UE-R and UE-E according to the security en-
hancement protocol are shown in Fig. 5.4a and Fig. 5.4b respectively.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.4: SDL diagram from (a) UE-E’s prospective and (b) UE-R’s prospective.
58
CHAPTER 5. SECURITY ENHANCEMENT OF THE PROPOSED
PROTOCOLS
5.6 Protocol Validation using SPIN
The validation output for the proposed security enhancement protocol is shown in
Fig. 5.5a and Fig. 5.5b. As shown in Fig. 5.5a, in reactive protocol, UE-R initiate
the authentication process by sending its public key, Pr to UE-E. UE-E responds
with sending its public key, Pe to UE-R. After verification of digital signature Dr
and De by UE-E and UE-R respectivley they verify hash(Ni ‘ Nj) contains in
messages Mr and Me. Tr and Te are the timestamps used by UE-E and UE-R at
which messages are generated to prevent the replay attack. Security enhancement
protocol works in the same manner for proactive protocol except UE-E initiates
the authentication process after receiving service broadcast message from UE-R
as in Fig. 5.5b.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.5: SPIN verification output for security enhancement protocol (a) Reac-
tive protocol and (b) Proactive protocol.
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SPIN verification output
The verification output of security enhancement protocol for reactive and proac-
tive protocols are shown in Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7 respectively. As it can be seen
from output that both protocol verifies without errors and reached to the depth 18.
Figure 5.6: SPIN verification output of security enhancement protocol for reactive
protocol.
Figure 5.7: SPIN verification output of security enhancement protocol for proac-
tive protocol.
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5.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter has proposed security enhancement protocol for neighbor and service
discovery protocols, reactive and proactive. This chapter has explained the secu-
rity challenges and the possible threats for the selected scenarios of D2D commu-
nication. The proposed security enhancement protocol is based on Diffi-Hellman
key exchanged algorithm. Digital signature is used to mutually authenticate two
communicating UEs. Notification messages is exchanged to notify each other
about the confirmation of verification. After verification process, UE-E and UE-R
agreed on common secret key, which can be used for encryption/decryption of the
messages exchanged between them. Security enhancement protocol is initiated
in proposed reactive protocol after UE-R receives discovery message from UE-E.
On the other hand, in proposed proactive protocol, security enhancement protocol
is initiated by UE-E after receiving ”Multicast D2D service invitation” message
from UE-R. Security enhancement protocol is implemented and validated by us-
ing SDL and SPIN model checker respectively. The proposed security protocol
validated successfully without errors.
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Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarize thesis work, contribution based on our findings and sug-
gestion for future work.
6.1 Summary
This thesis presents work related to D2D communication. The first part of the
project was a summarization of the general concepts of D2D communication and
its enabling technologies. By studying 3GPP technical reports and its suggested
scenarios for D2D communication, one scenario is selected as primary scenario.
In the scenario, UE-R is located inside and UE-E is located outside of coverage
area. Based on this scenario, reactive and proactive protocols are proposed. Fur-
thermore, the implementations of the mentioned protocols design using SDL. The
proposed protocols are validated using SPIN model checker. The obtained simu-
lation and verification results were represented.
Furthermore, this Master’s thesis has given discussion about the possible D2D
security challenges and threats, proposed security protocol for mutual authentica-
tion and establishment of common secret key, protocol analysis and validation of
proposed protocol.
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6.2 Contributions
This Master’s thesis has contributed in following areas:
• The two neighbor and service discovery protocols have been proposed for
scenario 1B as suggested by 3GPP for D2D communication. Both protocols
give an overview of how UEs discover each other when UE-E(s) is located
outside network coverage area and UE-R is located inside coverage area
with out getting support from BS.
• The proposed protocols with and without security enhancement have been
implemented and verified.
• The two proposed protocols have been compared in terms of protocol over-
head which was calculated in MATLAB simulation environment. This the-
sis suggests which protocol is suitable for D2D communication for selected
scenario based on overhead calculation. For the calculation, different cases
of D2D requests have been considered.
• The security enhancement protocol based on Diffi-Hellman algorithm has
been proposed in order to mutually authenticate UE-E and UE-R as well as
common secret key has been established to encrypt/decrypt the handshake
messages.
6.3 Future Work
Research on D2D communication has been a hot topic taking the attention of
many scientific researchers in mobile technology. We presented two protocols
design for D2D communication. However, future works are needed to improve
the performance of our proposed protocols. For future work, it is suggested:
• Using different use case scenario to improve the usability and efficient of
our protocols in real world environment.
• To proposed protocol for D2D communication between multiple UE-Rs and
one UE-E.
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• Improve the security of proposed protocols using a lightweight encryp-
tion/decryption scheme.
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PROMELA code
(i) PROMELA code for reactive protocol
mtype = { discovery_req, ack, d2d_adm, service_req, got_service, BYE}
byte idE;
byte idR;
byte idB;
byte idA;
byte Ecode;
chan BR = [1] of { mtype};
chan ER = [1] of { mtype};
chan BA = [1] of { mtype};
int count=2;
bool tmpEnd, tmpBS, tmpRelay;
int To=5;
active proctype EndUser()
{
T0: ER!discovery_req;
if
::ER?d2d_adm
::tmpEnd==To -> goto T0
fi;
T5: ER!service_req;
if
::ER?got_service
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:: tmpEnd==To ->
if
::(count!=0);
do
::count=count-1->goto T5
::else ->break
od
::(count==0) ->skip
fi
fi;
T7: ER!BYE;
if
::ER?ack->skip
::tmpEnd==To ->skip
fi
}
active proctype RelayUser()
{
T0: ER?discovery_req;
T2: BR!discovery_req;
if
::BR?d2d_adm
:: tmpRelay==To->
if
::(count!=0);
do
::count=count-1->goto T2
::else->break
od
::(count==0)-> skip
fi
fi;
ER!d2d_adm;
T8: ER?service_req;
T10: BR!service_req;
if
::BR?got_service
::tmpRelay==To ->
if
::(count!=0);
do
::count=count-1->goto T10
::else->break
od
::(count==0) -> skip
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fi
fi;
ER!got_service;
T16: ER?BYE;
T18: ER!ack;
T20: BR!BYE
}
active proctype BaseStation()
{
T1: BR?discovery_req;
T3: BA!discovery_req;
if
::BA?d2d_adm
::(tmpBS==To)->
if
::(count!=0);
do
::count=count-1->goto T3
::else ->break
od
::(count==0)->skip
fi
fi;
T8: BR!d2d_adm;
T10: BR?service_req;
T12: BA!service_req
if
::BA?got_service
::tmpBS==To->
if
::(count!=0);
do
::count=count-1->goto T12
::else ->break
od
::(count==0)->skip
fi;
fi;
BR!got_service;
BR?BYE
}
active proctype AppServer()
{
BA?discovery_req;
BA!d2d_adm;
BA?service_req;
BA!got_service;
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}
(ii) PROMELA code for proactive code
mtype = { broad, d2d_req,d2d_inv, multc_s, d2d_resp, ack, d2d_adm, serv_req, serv_confirm, serv_prov, BYE };
chan BR = [1] of { mtype };
chan BA = [1] of { mtype };
chan ER = [1] of { mtype };
byte count=2;
byte count_br=2;
byte To=5;
proctype BS()
{
bool tmpBS;
S1: BR!broad;
if
::BR?d2d_req;
S2: BA!d2d_req;
if
::BA?d2d_adm;
S3: BR!d2d_adm;
if
::BR?serv_req;
S4: BA!serv_req;
if
::BA?serv_confirm;
BR!serv_confirm;
BR?BYE
::tmpBS==To->
if
::(count!=0)->
do
::count=count-1 -> goto S4
::else->break
od
::(count==0)-> printf("idle")
fi
fi
::tmpBS==To-> goto S3
fi
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::tmpBS==To->goto S2
fi
::tmpBS==To->
if
::(count_br!=0)->
do
::count_br=count_br-1 -> goto S1
::else->break
od
::(count==0)-> printf("idle")
fi
fi
}
proctype AppServer()
{
bool tmpAppS;
if
::BA?d2d_req;
BA!d2d_adm
::tmpAppS==To->printf("Idle")
fi
if
::BA?serv_req;
BA!serv_confirm
::tmpAppS==To->printf("Idle")
fi
}
proctype EndUser()
{
bool tmpEnd;
ER?d2d_inv;
ER!d2d_resp;
ER?multc_s;
S3: ER!serv_req;
if
::ER?serv_confirm;
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ER?BYE;
ER!ack;
printf("Idle");
::tmpEnd==To->
if
::(count!=0);
do
::count=count-1->goto S3
::else->break
od
::(count==0)->printf("Idle")
fi
fi
}
proctype RelayUser ()
{
bool tmpRelay;
BR?broad;
S1: ER!d2d_inv;
if
::ER?d2d_resp;
S2: BR!d2d_req;
if
::BR?d2d_adm;
S3: ER!multc_s;
if
::ER?serv_req;
S4: BR!serv_req;
if
::BR?serv_confirm;
ER!serv_confirm;
ER!BYE;
if
::ER?ack;
BR!BYE;
::tmpRelay==To;
BR!BYE;
fi
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::tmpRelay==To-> goto S4
fi
::tmpRelay==To-> goto S3
fi
::tmpRelay==To;
if
::(count!=0);
do
::count=count-1 -> goto S2
::else->break
od
::(count==0)->printf("Idle")
fi
fi
::tmpRelay==To;
if
::(count_br!=0);
do
::count=count-1 -> goto S1
::else->break
od
::(count==0)->printf("Idle");
fi
fi
}
init {run EndUser(); run RelayUser (); run BS (); run AppServer ();}
(iii) PROMELA code for security enhancement protocol
mtype={Pe,Pr,Te,Tr,De,Dr,Me,Mr};
chan ER= [1] of {byte,byte,mtype,mtype};
byte idE;
byte idR;
active proctype EndUser()
{
ER!idE,idR,Pe,Te;
ER?idR,idE,Pr,Tr;
ER!idE,idR,De,Te;
ER?idR,idE,Dr,Tr;
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ER!idE,idR,Me,Te;
ER?idR,idE,Mr,Tr;
if
::(Me==Mr)->printf("UE-E authenticate UE-R");
::else->skip
fi
}
active proctype RelayUser()
{
S2: ER?idE,idR,Pe,Te;
ER!idR,idE,Pr,Tr;
ER?idE,idR,De,Te;
ER!idR,idE,Dr,Tr;
ER?idE,idR,Me,Te;
ER!idR,idE,Mr,Tr;
if
::(Me==Mr)->printf("UE-R authneticate UE-E")
::else->skip
fi
}
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SPIN State Diagram
(i) For proactive protocol
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Figure B.1: State diagram from UE-E’s prospective for proactive protocol.
(ii) For reactive protoccol
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Figure B.2: State diagram from UE-R’s prospective for proactive protocol.
79
APPENDIX B. SPIN STATE DIAGRAM
Figure B.3: State diagram from BS’s prospective for proactive protocol.
(iii) For security enhancement Protocol
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Figure B.4: State diagram from AS’s prospective for proactive protocol.
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Figure B.5: State diagram from UE-E’s prospective for reactive protocol.
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Figure B.6: State diagram from UE-R’s prospective for reactive protocol.
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Figure B.7: State diagram from BS’s prospective for reactive protocol.
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Figure B.8: State diagram from AS’s prospective for reactive protocol.
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Figure B.9: SPIN state diagram from UE-E’s prospective for security enhance-
ment protocol.
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Figure B.10: SPIN state diagram from UE-R’s prospective for security enhance-
ment protocol.
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MATLAB Code
(i) Control overhead calculation for both protocol when D2D request is nor-
mally distributed
Sig=2.14; %Standard deviation
mu=3.8; %Mean
T=20; % Total timeslot
K=20; %Total timeslots at which D2D request occurs
M=mu+Sig*randn(1,K); %Normally generated random number
TH1=K*(2+(14*M)); %Total handshake for Proactive protocol
TH2=(K*15*M); %Total handshake for reactive protocol
CO1=(2*(T-K)+TH1)./T; %Control overhead for proactive protocol
CO2=TH2./T; %Control overhead for reactive protocol
hold on
plot(M,CO1,'-ˆ',M,CO2,'-o');
legend('Proactive, D2D','Reactive,D2D');
xlabel('Normally Generated D2D Request');
ylabel('Control overhead for Normally Generated D2D Requests');
title('Control Overhead Vs Number of D2D Request');
grid on;
(ii) Control overhead calculation for both protocol when D2D request is same at
each timeslot
T=20; %Total timeslot
M=5; %D2D request at each timeslot
K=1:1:20; %Total timeslot at which D2D request occurs
TH1=(2+(14*M)); %Total handshake Proactive protocol per one timeslot
TH2=(15*M); %Total handshake reactive protocol per one timeslot
CO1=(K*TH1+(2*(T-K)))/T; %Control overhead for Proactive protocol
CO2=(K*TH2)/T; %Control overhead for reactive protocol.
plot(K,CO1,'-*',K,CO2,'-ˆ');
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legend('Proactive','Reactive');
xlabel('Number of Timeslots at which D2D Request Occurs');
ylabel('Protocol Overhead (number of handshakes per timeslot)');
title('Protocol Overhead vs Number of Timeslots with D2D Request');
grid on;
(iii) Control overhead calculation for both protocol when D2D request is differ-
ent at each timeslot
d=0:10:100; % Allowable distance for D2D communication
D=100; %Maximium distance betwwen UE-R and UE-E.
N=15; %Total number of UE-E in the area not covered by cell
n=10; %Number of UE-E user with Prose services among N user.
R=1000; %Radius of the Netowork coverage cell.
r=980;
h=20;
z=h*(2*R-h);
a=2*sqrt(z);
A1=square(R)*acos((R-h)/R);
A2=pi*(Dˆ2)/2; %Area of semi circle covered by UE-R
A=A2-A1; %Area lies outside network coverage cell
lembda=N/A; %UE-Es density
P=1-exp(-lembda*pi*(d.ˆ2)); %Proximity probability PPP distribution.
K=14; % Total timeslots at which D2D requests occur.
M=0:1:10; %Random number od D2D requests
T=20; %Total timeslot
t=9;
for i=0:t
Y = 1-binocdf(i,n,P);
i=i+1;
end
TH1=(2+(14*M)); %Total handshake for Proactive protocol
TH2=(15*M); %Total handshake for reactive protocol
CO1=(K*TH1+(2*(T-K)))/T; %Control overhead for Proactive protocol
CO2=(K*TH2)/T; %Control overhead for reactive protocol.
CO1=Y.*CO1;
CO2=Y.*CO2;
plot(d,CO1,'-*',d,CO2,'-ˆ');
legend('Proactive','Reactive');
xlabel('Target distance, D (m)');
ylabel('Protocol overhead (Total number of handshake per timeslot)');
title('Protocol overhead vs. target distance (m)');
grid on;
(iv) Proximity probability for at least k number of D2D request
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D=100; %maximium distance betwwen UE-R and UE-E.
d=1:10:100; %Targeted distance between UE-E and UE-R.
N=15; %UE-Es outside coverage area
%n=1:1:10; %Number of UE-E user with Prose services among N user.
r=980; %Distance between BS and UE-R.
h=20; %Distance between edge of network coverage and UE-R
z=h*(2*R-h);
a=2*sqrt(z); %Length of chord inside coverage cell.
A1=square(R)*acos((R-h)/R); %Area of sector inside cell
A2=pi*(Dˆ2)/2;%Area of the semi circle covered by UE-R
A=A2-A1; %Area outside cell covered by UE-R
lembda=N/A; %UE-Es density outside cell
P=1-exp(-lembda*pi*(d.ˆ2));%Proximity probability in given area..
k0=9; %Number of UE-E outside coverage area
k1=7;
k2=5;
k3=3;
k4=1;
Y0=1-binocdf(k0,n,P); %Probability at which atleast one UE-E send request
Y1=1-binocdf(k1,n,P);
Y2=1-binocdf(k2,n,P);
Y3=1-binocdf(k3,n,P);
Y4=1-binocdf(k4,n,P);
plot(d,Y0,'-kv',d,Y1,'-o',d,Y2,'-ˆ',d,Y3,'-*',d,Y4,'-x');
legend('P(k=9)','P(k=7)','P(k=5)','P(k=3)','P(k=1)');
xlabel('Distance between UE-R and UE-E');
ylabel('Probability of k UE-E to be D2D pair with UE-R');
title('Probability of atleast k UE-E send request vs Proximity distance');
grid on;
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